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Abstract
In the last decade, Fidesz has dominated the Hungarian political landscape, becoming the most extensive Hungarian party
organisation in terms of party members, structuration, resources, and influence. The party’s organisational development
has been determined by a constant strategic adaptation to new circumstances of political reality and new demands of the
electorate. The article argues that in three phases of its development, Fidesz adopted different party organisation guide‐
lines. As a result, a hybrid party architecture was formed involving various characteristics and strategies of mass parties
(e.g., relatively large membership and ideological communication), movement parties (i.e., top‐down generation of mass
rallies and protest activities), personal parties (i.e., personalisation, centralisation of party leadership), and cartel parties
(i.e., use of state resources, control over party competition). Instead of switching from one strategy to another, the party
often used these strategies simultaneously. This flexible party organisation can balance among the different needs of effec‐
tive governance, constant mobilisation, and popular sovereignty. The article aims to dissect these building blocks of Fidesz
to gain insight into the emergence of the hybrid party model.
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1. Introduction
The Fidesz–Magyar Polgári Szövetség (Fidesz or Fidesz–
Hungarian Civic Alliance) stands out not just from
Hungarian but also Central‐Eastern European parties for
its longevity and organisational, political, and ideological
adaptability. Founded by a group of politically active stu‐
dents in 1988, it has evolved from a small liberal move‐
ment party to the leading actor of the centre‐right, con‐
servative camp as well as the government coalition of
1998. After losing two elections in 2002 and 2006, it
re‐emerged as the dominant party of the political land‐
scape, winning a two‐thirdsmajority three times in a row
from 2010 to 2018. Unlike many of its peers, the party
avoided any major intraparty conflicts and schisms and
established itself as the most extensive Hungarian party
organisation in terms of party members, structuration
resources, and influence. Thus, Fidesz is a prime exam‐
ple of Enyedi’s (2014) theory that adaptation to new cir‐
cumstances of political reality and new demands of the
electorate can be considered to be critical for a party’s
survival and success.
Fidesz’s organisational, ideological, and political
development has not followed a unidirectional trajec‐
tory. Likemany parties, Fidesz has adopted diverse guide‐
lines of party organisation to pursue different goals
at different times. However, instead of switching from
one strategy to another, we picture these strategies as
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layers of change that often simultaneously persist. This
opportunistic conversion (cf. Mahoney & Thelen, 2009)
was concentrated on the party’s external relations with
voters and the state, leaving its internal rules largely
untouched. Due to the concentration of party leader‐
ship and the collapse of support for other right‐wing
parties (after the 2000s) and the major left‐wing par‐
ties (after 2006), the party was able to experiment and
refine strategies without significant barriers or interfer‐
ence. Moreover, after its landslide victory in 2010, the
party took advantage of the government position to
further expand the scope of the party beyond the for‐
mal institutional frames. This development trajectory
is rather peculiar given that Fidesz is one of the few
mainstream political actors in Europe which has radi‐
calised and become more populist in its politics. As a
result, Fidesz has built a hybrid party organisation which
demonstrates selected characteristics of mass parties,
personal parties, movement parties, and even cartel par‐
ties. In other words, the party provides a perfect exam‐
ple of organisational innovation by applying a new com‐
bination of existing practices and different forms of party
organisation (cf. Schumpeter, 2006, p. 132).
The mixture of different organisational practices has
helped the party to simultaneously strengthen and main‐
tain its various linkages to voters (charismatic, clientelist,
and programmatic; cf. Kitschelt, 2000). The concentra‐
tion of power and the informal emergence of the leader
(presidentialisation; Hloušek, 2015) lie at the heart of
party development and have resulted in a personal or
personalised party (Musella, 2018). Phrased differently,
party organisational politics are largely determined by
Viktor Orbán’s charismatic leadership (charismatic link‐
age). This strong, personalised leadership has also pre‐
vented intraparty conflicts within different organisational
layers as the concentration of power allows for the con‐
trol of all levels of the party. At the same time, mass
party organisational strategy (see Albertazzi & van Kessel,
2021) has been reflected in the recruitment of activist
support for (offline or online) campaigning. Fidesz’s iden‐
tity politics have strengthened this strategy, as the envi‐
sioned Christian, national, and conservative community
can be mobilised by specific political messages (program‐
matic linkages). In governing position, the party has been
able to strengthen its embeddedness in society by radi‐
cally reforming certain areas of social life (culture, sports,
etc.) in order to further promote this identity.
However, conscious and unhindered development
has sometimes led to extreme organisational forms.
Fidesz’s cartel party characteristics show critical devia‐
tion from the ideal type (Katz & Mair, 1995). The domes‐
tic political crisis triggered by the former socialist Prime
Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány’s “lying speech” in 2006
(which was accompanied by enduring anti‐government
demonstrations and street violence) permanently broke
the former party cartel of major governing parties
(Ilonszki & Várnagy, 2014b; cf. Enyedi, 2006). After
2010, Fidesz gained a dominant position in Hungarian
politics with its non‐autonomous coalition partner
Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KDNP or Christian
Democratic People’s Party). Thismeant that therewas no
longer a need to cooperate with other parties. Fidesz’s
dominant position made it possible for it to occupy the
state and to control party competition by itself to ensure
its own electoral success. In other words, Fidesz is able
to act as the sole agent of the state, capable of creat‐
ing and maintaining clientelist networks at all levels of
Hungarian society (Körösényi et al., 2020, pp. 93–115;
Mares & Young, 2018).
In order to support charismatic leadership and coun‐
terbalance the cartel‐like behaviour, Fidesz applies “the
organisational and strategic practices of social move‐
ments in the arena of party competition” (Kitschelt,
2006, p. 280; see also Almeida, 2010, p. 174). However,
the movements that directly support the party (the Civic
Circles and the Civil Cooperation Forum) were created
in a top‐down manner with no autonomy compared to
other radical right‐wing movement parties (Gunther &
Diamond, 2003, p. 189) or left‐wing party‐driven move‐
ments (Muldoon & Rye, 2020). Thus, the movement
party characteristics have manifested in an extreme
way as the party uses this strategy as a tool for con‐
stant mobilisation. Overall, these new organisational
practices accompanied by populist rhetoric blur the line
between intra‐parliamentary, extra‐parliamentary, and
government politics.
The article aims to explore this hybrid organisa‐
tional strategy of Fidesz. The analysis is structured as
follows. First, we describe the organisational and ide‐
ological evolution of the party in its three develop‐
mental phases. Second, the analysis addresses current
organisational development, including the evolution of
activists’ networks and recruitment processes. Third, we
consider centralised and personalised party leadership
and party cartelisation.
2. The Ideological and Organisational Evolution
of Fidesz
At the ideological and organisational level, the histor‐
ical development of Fidesz can be divided into three
main phases (see Figure 1): (a) the earlymovement party
phase (1988–1993) characterised by collective leader‐
ship and liberal centrist ideology; (b) the personalised
catch‐all party phase (1993–2002) which presented pro‐
fessionalisation and an ideological transition to a right‐
wing, conservative ideological position; and (c) from
2002 onwards which reveals how the party’s current ide‐
ological and organisational profile gradually developed
into what we call a “hybrid party.” Recently, the party has
shown amix of characteristics: Some of its features, such
as the massive membership and organisational expan‐
sion, recall mass party strategy, while other strategic ele‐
ments (creating affiliated organisations, mass rallies, and
protest activities in a top‐down manner) are similar to
that ofmovement parties and Viktor Orbán’s charismatic
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Figure 1. Ideological and organisational transformation phases of Fidesz.
leadership is a trait of personal parties. At the same
time, the monopolisation of state resources and the
dominance in public office remind us of cartel parties.
The biggest change perceived is the “populist turn” of
the party, both in terms of communication and strategy
(cf. Enyedi & Róna, 2018).
2.1. First Phase: The Movement Party
Fidesz was not born as a party per se during the emer‐
gence of new parties in the transition period but rather
as a university activist group. The group promoted rad‐
ically liberal political ideas and was set on introducing
a new generation of politicians. At the time of its foun‐
dation, the party only accepted members under the
age of 35 under the name of the Alliance of Young
Democrats (Fideszwas originally the abbreviation for this
name). The party showed several traits ofmovement par‐
ties (Kitschelt, 2006, pp. 280–281): It gained popularity
through its involvement in protests andmass demonstra‐
tions and relied on the principles of participatory democ‐
racy. As van Biezen (2003, p. 123) has emphasised, party
members played a crucial role: “The delegates to the
national council were elected directly by the local groups,
and their votes were weighed in accordance with the
number of members they represented.” There was also
no centralised leadership; instead, the party was man‐
aged collectively—a trait shared by Western Green par‐
ties (M. Balázs & Enyedi, 1996)—until Orbán was elected
as leader of the parliamentary party group in 1990 and
as president of the party in 1993.
2.2. Second Phase: The Personalistic Catch‐All Party
After the 1993 party congress, Fidesz launched a new
political and organisational strategy to mobilise more
voters, increase governing potential and become more
professional. Members lost their potential to directly
influence party decisions at the party congress. Local
party groups became territorially organised (allowing for
one group in eachmunicipality). Theywere subordinated
to the higher levels of decision making, resulting in a
higher level of centralisation and power concentration.
The role of the party president was strengthened, which
was a clear step towards personalisation. In order to
reach out more, the party needed to establish stronger
ties to society. As Enyedi (2005, p. 708) wrote, “the lead‐
ership realised that the party needed a Hinterland, a net‐
work of organisations, media forums and elite groups
that could bring social legitimacy, expertise, and various
other resources.” Thus, the party started to build coali‐
tions with right‐wing elites as well as with the clergy.
An ideological turn accompanied the organisational
reform as the party shifted its profile from liberal to a
more conservative, centre‐right party. The party offered
a “coming of age” narrative which basically conveyed
the message that as the founding politicians became
more mature, they recognised the importance of con‐
servative values. As a result, the party in 1995 abol‐
ished the age limit of 35 for membership and reinvented
the party’s brand by renaming it Fidesz–Hungarian Civic
Party. The transformation was rewarded by the success
of the 1998 elections.
2.3. Third Phase: The Hybrid Party
The electoral defeat of 2002 came as a surprise to the
party as Fidesz was hoping to capitalise on its govern‐
mental role and the results of the 1998–2002 period.
Confident in its achievements, the party attributed the
electoral loss to a lack of ability to mobilise voters
in time for the elections. Thus, Fidesz engaged in a
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new organisational strategy of building a network called
Citizens’ Alliance. This strategy established a cultural
and social community which relied on civic initiatives to
mobilise its voter base (Greskovits, 2020; Metz, 2015;
Szabó, 2011).
Along with the mobilisation strategy, the party
adjusted its political message to amplify its appeal.
Despite the growing polarisation between the left
and right, Fidesz decided to reach out to an even
broader base of voters by innovating its economic pro‐
file. The new set of messages integrated traditionally
left‐wing economic policies, nationalism and populist
demands (Enyedi & Róna, 2018, pp. 255–256). After
2010, the populist style and strategy based on the
us–them dichotomy, the use of referendums, and the
so‐called national consultation, which takes the form of
a national survey sponsored by the government, gradu‐
ally became the primary mode of government politics.
Within the framework of consultation, the national sur‐
vey sends around eight million questionnaires to vot‐
ers and includes rather manipulative questions, such as:
“Do you agree with the Hungarian government that sup‐
port should be focused more on Hungarian families and
the children they can have, rather than on immigration?”
The rise of participatory methods allowed the govern‐
ment to frame its decisions to respond to voters’ expecta‐
tions and let the party overrun its ideological boundaries
by selling a responsive image to the electorate.
In the following sections, we detail the developments
of the third phase, focusing on the different elements of
the hybrid party, that is, party organisation, recruitment
mechanisms, social movement repertoire, party leader‐
ship, and cartelisation of the party.
3. Between Mass and Movement Party
In order to increase organisational stability and social
embeddedness, Fidesz combined the elements of mass
parties with movement party strategies. While the party
could establish a considerable degree of organisation
(at least in the Hungarian context), these strategies go
far beyond the institutional framework of the party.
We now present these two interrelated mobilisation
and recruitment strategies of the party. We focus on
how the party makes great efforts both online and
offline to attract new members and activists. We also
take into account its (probable) reasons for building an
activist base.
3.1. Offline Mobilisation Through Networks of Affiliated
Organisations and Activists
Although its core structure has remained relatively stable
since 1993, Fidesz has selectively applied elements of the
mass party strategy to create a well‐established organ‐
isation, membership base, and culturally and ideologi‐
cally homogenous community of supporters (Hinterland).
The present‐day structure of party organisation is thus
the result of considerable previous recruitment work.
The basic organisational unit is the municipal‐level
party group, and its functions are mainly focussed on
organising the local life of the party. Fidesz today has
the most developed organisational network in Hungary,
with 1.220 municipal‐level party groups in 2015, which
is extensive compared to the other two major parties
of the time: Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Jobbik,
Movement for a Better Hungary) with 834 groups and
the Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP or Hungarian Socialist
Party) with 463 groups (Horváth & Soós, 2015, p. 255).
As the next step on the party ladder, the electoral district‐
based units are led by a loyal party member who is often
the candidate running for the respective single‐member
district at the national elections. Above them, there are
regional committees that only bear a minimum level of
responsibility within the party. In the territorial hierar‐
chy, the next step is the National Board, which consists of
the National Presidium members, the regional commit‐
tee leaders, the delegates from district‐based units, the
party’s European Parliament delegation leader and the
leaders of the partner organisations. The National Board
manages the operative issues of the party between
party congresses. The two most important central bod‐
ies are the Congress, which has the right to make and/or
approve all decisions, and the National Presidium, which
acts as the executive within the party.
Regarding party membership, according to data col‐
lected by Kovarek and Soós (2016), only 1% of the
Hungarian population belongs to any party. While Fidesz
has devoted a critical level of resources to increasing
party membership, it nonetheless stays below 38,000
members, which is still higher than any other party’s
(e.g., theMSZP had 20,000members in 2015, Jobbik had
15,000; see Kovarek & Soós, 2016). Compared to other
parties in Hungary (Kovarek, 2020), the requirements
to become a party member are not as strict, yet they
reflect the party’s lack of openness: The applicant must
have three recommendation letters from members who
have been members of the party for at least one year.
In addition, as a reflection of the relationship between
KDNP and Fidesz, members are encouraged to have dual
party membership.
While holding governmental power, Fidesz needed a
strategy to uphold itsmobilisation potential, which relied
on protest sentiments prior to 2010. Borrowing from
the toolbox of movements and movement parties, the
party launched a series of rallies (e.g., peace marches)
that were initiated by organisations close to the party
elite (predominantly by the former Civic Circles). These
demonstrations revitalised the party’s civil network and
renewed its ties to society. In order to ensure central
party control over these events, the party decided in
approximately the late 2000s to integrate these initia‐
tives into the party organisations by annexing these
organisations. The expansion of the party organisation
allowed for greater control and direct outreach to sup‐
porters on the ground.
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The networks of affiliated organisations benefited
the party on two levels. At the organisational level, it
strengthened the party by increasing the number of
local party groups and membership. The first network,
called the Civic Circles Movement, founded by Orbán,
was aimed at reuniting the right by integrating politi‐
cians, activists, and voters of other right‐wing parties
that had been weakened or disintegrated after the loss
of the 2002 elections. The movement consisted of more
than 11,000 civic circles and engaged approximately
163,000 members and was also connected to numer‐
ous church‐bound, patriotic, professional, cultural, and
local organisations. These local circles often became
the focal point for local party organisations and offered
a recruitment platform which resulted in a sevenfold
increase in the party’s membership. However, the decen‐
tralised nature of the Civic Circles contradicted the
party’s development strategy, and soon this movement
was reformed under a non‐governmental organisation,
the Civil Cooperation Forum.
At the ideological level, this organisational network
helped to re‐establish and revitalise the bond between
voters, supporters, and members by building a commu‐
nity that, in the party’s rhetoric, embodies the nation
and the people. One of the most significant challenges
was overcoming ideological diversity since the network
brought together voters and supporters with different
political backgrounds. However, the routinisation of pop‐
ulist politics and mobilisation (from small gatherings
to mass rallies) have broken down the substantial ide‐
ological barriers in the right‐wing camp. Such regu‐
lar events—Tranzit Festival, Tusványos Festival, and the
party’s annual privatemeeting at Kötcse—serve this goal
by providing an opportunity for the political, administra‐
tive, and cultural elites associatedwith the party to come
together. The culmination of events is usually Viktor
Orbán’s speech, which sets out the main political direc‐
tion and topics for the near future. The Civil Cooperation
Forum has also orchestrated several mass events since
2012 to express support for government politics. Among
these events, themost notable is the peacemarch organ‐
ised each year, which displays a curious mix of charac‐
teristics. The event itself is shaped as a demonstration
closely linked to the party (through the use of party sym‐
bols) and bears a strong resemblance to official state
events with the prime minister addressing “the People,”
“the nation.” This mix of characteristics clearly shows
how the party and its leaders have blurred the lines
between state politics and party politics, with Orbán as
the official leader of both the party and the country. This
personalisation strategy presented Orbán as not only the
official party leader and the elected leader of the country
but also as the ideological leader of the political right.
As a continuation of its focus on increasing its mobil‐
isation potential, Fidesz from 2004 onwards compiled a
list of supporters, voters, and activists. The list became
the central element of supporter and activist mobilisa‐
tion. It was known as the “Kubatov list” in public dis‐
course, named after Gábor Kubatov, the party director,
central campaign manager, and vice‐president. While
canvassing has long been part of the parties’ mobilisa‐
tion toolbox and has often been used for accumulat‐
ing systematic databases about voters with their con‐
sent, opposition parties have continuously challenged
the party’s methods of data collection. Based on a video
made by opposition activists, the Curia (Supreme Court)
of Hungary issued a decision stating that Fidesz activists
had violated the rules of political data collection by mis‐
leading voters as to the use of their data (Kúria, 2019).
The need for coordinatedmobilisation also led Fidesz
to establish a formalised network of activists. In 2014,
the “Hungarian Team” was formed, engaging more than
100,000 supporters as activists in the election campaign
(Szalai, 2014). Later similar but hidden task forces fol‐
lowed, often engaging young activists, such as paid high
school students among others (Magyari, 2015). These
activists are on the borderline of the party structure:
While many only temporarily engage in political activism,
some devoted and loyal supporters find their way into
the party organisation and even launch careers.
The recruitment of political, administrative and cul‐
tural elite also became a burning issue within the party,
as the direct and indirect influence of Fidesz became
more extensive and expansive in the various level of
politics (media, government, party competition). Three
recruitment paths emerged. The first path leads through
the party where the entry‐level is local politics or the
party’s youth organisation Fidelitas. It serves as a recruit‐
ment, training, and socialising camp for wannabe politi‐
cians. Indeed, many members of the new elite jump‐
started their career at Fidelitas, forming the nucleus of
the National Cooperation System, which can be regarded
as the elite network system behind Fidesz’s and Viktor
Orbán’s regime.
The second path represents the party’s narrower gov‐
ernmental and political Hinterland. The central govern‐
ment and pro‐government think‐tanks offer scholarships
or/and jobs to undergraduate and graduate students
with relevant knowledge and expertise. The intern‐
ship programme of the Fidesz’s party foundation, the
Foundation for Civic Hungary, which is aimed at univer‐
sity students, is an excellent example of this practice.
This programme is designed to engage politically commit‐
ted and active students in the party’s professional back‐
ground work.
The third path goes through less political or ideologi‐
cal networks of knowledge centres and educational insti‐
tutions, such as the Matthias Corvinus Colleguim (MCC),
which is a “quasi‐college for advanced studies” financed
directly by the government. While colleges for advanced
studies have a long tradition in Hungary, and many of
them are centres of academic excellence, MCC has not
only a strong ideological profile but maintains clear and
strong ties to the government. The institution is led
by a prominent member of government, Balázs Orbán,
deputy minister of the Hungarian prime minister’s office.
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Its extensive programme that reaches out to students
from all over Hungary and to those beyond the bor‐
der is financed by government grants, as MCC has been
awarded billions of forints from the state budget and has
received a transfer of shares and real estate from the gov‐
ernment. According to its vision, the college offers edu‐
cational programmes from elementary school onwards
for future leaders who are committed to working for
the nation.
3.2. Online Mobilisation Through Virtual Networks
Along with the efforts going into offline canvassing and
mass organisation, Fidesz’s online political presence has
been strengthened since 2010. In order to increase its
online presence, Fidesz politicians have been prompted
to increase their posting frequency. For example, the
minister of foreign affairs, Péter Szijjártó, who only
launched his official Facebook profile at the end of 2019,
gained 143,000 likes last year. Other prominent Fidesz
politicians, like Judit Varga (95,000 likes), Máté Kocsis
(94,000 likes), and Katalin Novák (79,000 likes) are far
less visible online. Viktor Orbán’s outreach, however, is
enormous compared to other politicians and parties (see
data on likes received in Table 1) and it witnessed a
recent upsurge generated by the Prime Minister’s strate‐
gic use of Facebook to introduce the government’s deci‐
sions about the pandemic. The pandemic news and the
need to be informed might allure site users not invested
in politics to the politician’s Facebook page.
While the accounts of politicians are more popu‐
lar than the official party accounts, they do not enjoy
autonomy from the party as their online presence is con‐
trolled by the party centre both in terms of content (cam‐
paign slogans andmessages) and funding (Facebook ads).
According to a recent analysis of an interview series with
Hungarian politicians (Oross & Tap, 2021), Fidesz has
established top‐down control its of social media pres‐
ence, making it mandatory for its politicians (from gov‐
ernment members to mayors and local faction leaders)
to join Facebook. In 2017, one year before the election,
the party centrally requested candidates to nominate a
virtual staff member to manage Facebook communica‐
tion and then provided them with specialised training.
Their responsibilities included managing the candidate’s
page, building the candidate’s online image, developing
a separate account from the official ones devoted to
negative campaigns, and involving online activists and
delegating tasks to them (Haszán, 2018). By the 2018
elections, the virtual activist networks showed a highly
centralised structure in which the control of campaign
activity was extensive. Part of this network came under
media scrutiny when anonymous sources unveiled that
many of its online activities, including posting, shar‐
ing and commenting, were not voluntary but required
within the network (Haszán, 2018), which undercut
their authenticity and pointed towards the manipulative
nature of online communication. Central party commu‐
nications also create the content (e.g., memes, pictures,
core messages, and slogans) for Facebook and dissem‐
inate it through the personal accounts of party mem‐
bers, politicians and activists. This centralisation is also
reflected in the fact that Fidesz completely lacks any
online platform for deliberation, candidate selection, pol‐
icy formation, and voting, unlike smaller parties in the
country (Oross & Tap, 2021, p. 15).
Table 1. Hungarian parties and their leaders’ presence on Facebook.
Likes (rounded numbers) Change from 20 March to 21 March
Fidesz 320,800 +23,500 (+8%)
Viktor Orbán 1,120,000 +146,200 (+15%)
Jobbik 534,500 +32,800 (+7%)
Péter Jakab 296,300 +156,400 (+112%)
Demokratikus Koalició (DK, Democratic Coalition) 167,500 +24,500 (+17%)
Ferenc Gyurcsány 298,500 +37,100 (+14%)
MSZP 216,300 +7,400 (+4%)
Bertalan Tóth 36,600 +12,700 (53%)
Ágnes Kunhalmi 42,500 +1,900 (+5%)
Párbeszéd (P, Dialogue) 132,000 +7,300 (+6%)
Tímea Szabó 152,700 +36,400 (+21%)
Gergely Karácsony 274,100 +47,000 (+21%)
Momentum 117,700 +6,200 (+6%)
András Fekete‐Győr 46,700 +17,700 (+61%)
Lehet Más a Politika (LMP, Politics Can Be Different) 74,800 +914 (+8%)
Erzsébet Schmuck 34,600 +18,300 (+113%)
Máté Kanász‐Nagy 5,400 +4,300 (+367%)
Note: Self‐collected from CrowdTangle (3 March 2021).
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In addition, the government and Fidesz are the most
significant Facebook advertisers in Hungary. The former
spent HUF 283.8 million and the latter HUF 141.6 mil‐
lion on advertising between 2019 and 2021 (Hanula,
2021a). It is also worth mentioning that the party was
the most generous in spending money on YouTube ads
(HUF 65 million) compared to other parties (Hanula,
2021b). The government and the party’s online activi‐
ties are difficult to distinguish (Hanula, 2021a). On the
government’s Facebook profile, the prime minister and
some prominent members of the government (most
notably Péter Szijjártó, Judit Varga, and Katalin Novák)
regularly appear, but their messages are rarely directly
connected to party politics. However, the issues they
raise (e.g., promoting Coronavirus vaccinations) often
feed into the political narrative of the party (e.g., Fidesz
politicians are pro‐vaccine while opposition politicians
are anti‐vaccine).
Despite the strengthening of its online strategy, the
most recent elections in 2018 revealed that the party
had lost touch with youngsters and intellectuals in urban
areas. Megaphone Centre, a new pro‐government initia‐
tive, explicitly undertakes to address like‐minded young
online activists, sponsors well‐known senior opinion
leaders (e.g., Philip Rákay and Zsolt Bayer), and offers
training and content for them to face this challenge.
Another digital platform called Axioma, founded by cir‐
cles close to Fidesz, operates along similar lines, produc‐
ing online content that echoes conservative values, and
often features high‐ranking government officials.
Overall, due to the applied elements of mass and
movement party strategies, Fidesz could have estab‐
lished a broad and extensive party organisation (at least
compared to other Hungarian parties). The party made
great efforts to attract members and activists in offline
and online space by mobilising them in a top‐down man‐
ner, creating controlled recruitment paths and central‐
ising the online presence of the party. The activist net‐
work based on offline linkages (Civic Circles, lists of party
activists, and supporters) proved to be strong enough
for a long time to mobilise enough people to win elec‐
tions. While supporters can grow tired of the continuous
campaign, the party devotes considerable efforts to pro‐
mote and sustain these networks. At the same time, it
provides innovations like online activism and specialised
elite recruitment throughparty channels, adapting to the
changing environment and new challenges.
4. Between Personal and Cartel Party
The organisational evolution showed intense centralisa‐
tion both in terms of leadership, which translated to
personalisation/presidentialisation, and in terms of state
capture and domination of political competition, which
manifested as a radical form of cartelisation.
Although the party was not born as a personal enter‐
prise, after 1994, under Viktor Orbán’s autonomous
charismatic leadership, it “became the most centralised,
most homogeneous and most disciplined party in the
country# (Enyedi, 2005, p. 708). The party’s organisa‐
tional and ideological transformation culminated in a
symbolic re‐foundation after the lost elections of 2002.
It was symbolised by changing the party name from
Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Party to Fidesz–Hungarian Civic
Alliance, integrating the right‐wing political spectrum.
Orbán’s leadership was also crucial to create, develop
and stabilise Fidesz on organisational and ideological lev‐
els (Metz & Oross, 2020). This transformation presented
the most evident shifts in the process of personalisa‐
tion and presidentialisation in Hungary and East‐Central
Europe (Hloušek, 2015). Let’s examine themain proof for
formal and informal power concentration.
In light of the formal rules, all power is concentrated
in the party’s National Presidium (Z. Balázs & Hajdú,
2017; Kovarek& Soós, 2016). This role can be interpreted
as the only real political forum for debates on crucial
issues. The party leadership dominates the relationship
between national and local bodies by appointing elec‐
toral district presidents who enjoy considerable power
within specific areas. This centralisation helps to bypass
the party on the ground (local and middle‐level lead‐
ers) and prevent the emergence of independent power
centres. Moreover, the National Board can dissolve its
local units for working against the party programme
or offending “the national interest of the party.” While
there are other central bodies, these are relatively weak:
Congress almost has only a legitimating function, and the
National Board’s power is also limited and dependent on
party leadership.
The National Presidium has formal control over key
internal direction fields. One of its most essential pre‐
rogatives is the exclusive right to initiate amendments
to basic party statutes; however, statutes can only be
modified by the National Board and must be approved
by Congress (Kertész, 2013). Due to this prerogative, the
party leadership can fully control the party organisation’s
development and the separation of power.
Another crucial question is how parliamentary can‐
didates (local, national, and European) are selected.
Formally, the nomination is managed by a national body,
the Electoral Coordinating Committee (ECC; Kertész,
2013), which is controlled and dominated by the
National Presidency and the party leader due to person‐
nel overlaps. The ECC can propose names for individ‐
ual districts, country lists, and European Parliament lists.
The room for modification is very limited: Local party
units can only make comments on the proposed names.
The National Board can only approve or reject the list but
cannot suggest anymodifications. Even in a case of rejec‐
tion (which has never yet happened), the party leader
has the right to override the decision and go forwardwith
the original list. TheNational Board’s independence from
the party leadership is questionable in any case: Its mem‐
bers are not delegated by local organisations but are pub‐
lic officials elected under the Fidesz party brand who are,
as a result, very dependent on the party leadership. It is
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also a telling fact that the nomination process for public
offices like Prime ministership and presidency is not reg‐
ulated in the party procedures, leaving more autonomy
for the party leader to promote its favoured candidate
(or themselves). The process of local government nom‐
ination is very similar: Based on local units’ proposals,
only a narrow county leadership (namely local govern‐
ments ECCs) decides on the matter. Moreover, the party
centre can override this decision.
The selection of party leaders is also closed (Ilonszki
& Várnagy, 2014a; Kertész, 2013). Congress elects the
party president or renews the mandate biannually, but
the nomination belongs to the National Presidium or
a nomination committee. The nomination procedure is
also not clearly regulated, which strengthens the posi‐
tion of the incumbent party leader. Looking beyond the
rules reveals that Orbán’s role has only once been chal‐
lenged in practice. Following the 1994 election defeat,
he resigned from the party presidency to take respon‐
sibility for the result, but he regained his power in the
next party leadership election. In 2000, as prime min‐
ister, he renounced the party leadership to create the
image of a responsible statesman who stands above par‐
tisan conflicts and politics. But since his informal influ‐
ence over the party has remained strong, he has passed
the formal title to his comrades or “close” allies (László
Kövér, Zoltán Pokorni, and János Áder). The defeat of
2002 provided an important lesson for Orbán: He recog‐
nised that political success in Hungarian politics requires
strong leadership and absolute control over the party.
He formally regained the position of party leader. Since
then, he more closely controls party‐related patronage
and surrounds himself with disciplined and loyal allies
who are dependent on him. Those who have created
autonomous power centres, or have repeatedly formu‐
lated opposite or alternative opinions, are neutralised
or marginalised. For instance, former ministers Tibor
Navracsics and János Lázár had to give up their portfolios
in exchange for low‐profile political positions.
Consequently, Fidesz doesn’t provide much room for
internal democracy, formally or informally. The party’s
particular characteristic is that the real debates are
only encouraged among the party elite in some closed
forums (e.g., Kötcse partymeetings, informal gatherings)
or through lobbying; expressing a critique publicly is
unacceptable since it is considered as a sign of weak‐
ness. The party substitutes internal democracy with a
symbolic and quasi‐direct relationship between mem‐
bers and leader. The leader’s direct and active interac‐
tion with its sympathisers, activists, and members cre‐
ates the pretence that the party is governed democrat‐
ically. However, even if the party organisation is exten‐
sive, it is also relatively weak (Z. Balázs & Hajdú, 2017;
Enyedi & Linek, 2008) and highly dependent on Orbán’s
leadership. As a result, theNational Presidium,which has
decisive power on paper, has become weightless in a
political sense. There is no open competition for National
Presidiummembership, similar to the uncontested party
leader selection (Ilonszki & Várnagy, 2014a). Members
are hand‐picked by Orbán, who typically rewards his
strongest and most loyal allies. Interestingly, the list of
office holders’ names is not available on the party’s web‐
site, which also gives the impression that they are not
important. Moreover, in contrast to the party statute,
major political decisions, such as leaving the European
People’s Party, are made by Orbán with the advice of
influential groups around him.
Since 2010, the party’s cartelisation has not only
become personalised but also conspicuous. This process
can be tracked through various developments inside the
party (i.e., the growing dominance of the party in pub‐
lic office) and even outside the party (i.e., state cap‐
ture through patronage and clientelism, controlling party
competition) that exploit tools and resources of the state.
Expressed differently, the party can freely employ the
state’s resources to limit political competition and ensure
its own electoral success.
Concerning the intraparty changes at the organi‐
sational level, we can observe a strong centralisation
and the consequent emergence of a small party elite.
The “party in the public office” saw its role strength‐
ened in comparison with the party in the central office
and party organisation and membership (party on the
ground). The growing dominance of the party in the
public office made it much harder to separate the dif‐
ferent faces of Fidesz’s organisation (Enyedi & Linek,
2008). As a result, the government function became
dominant within the party, subordinating the parliamen‐
tary and extra‐parliamentary functions. Party members
holding public office dominate the party’s highest bod‐
ies and internal decision making. Currently, everyone
from the eight‐member National Presidium has high‐
level positions in government or legislation (as Prime
minister, president of parliament, minister, secretary of
state, leader or members of the parliamentary faction).
Regarding state capture, Meyer‐Sahling and Jáger
(2012) documented extended party patronage beyond
the realm of business. Patronage practices are applied
in sectors such as the media, economics, and even,
to a certain extent, the judiciary. The most intriguing
practice is the capture of the government, which often
promotes party interest. One striking example is out‐
sourcing campaign activities to the government (and
partly to pro‐government NGOs). The party’s commu‐
nication activities are now indistinguishable from offi‐
cial government communication, effectively creating a
legal loophole for campaign finance rules. Although
national consultations and related campaigns, which
have become a permanent political tool since 2010,
are initiated and funded by the government, the aim
is to maintain and broaden support for the party and
Orbán’s leadership. By 2021, the government had organ‐
ised ten national consultations during which sugges‐
tive political questionnaires were sent to each house‐
hold with a letter from the prime minister focussed on
a particular topic (e.g., pensions, constitution‐making,
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social issues, economic issues, immigration, terrorism,
the Soros Plan, family entitlements, and the crisis man‐
agement of the coronavirus pandemic). Without formal
regulation, transparency and obligations of the referen‐
dums, this plebiscitary maintains a direct relationship
with Orbán’s constituents and legitimates decisions.
Capture of themedia was also critical to fostering the
dominance of the political agenda (as well as the political
competition). New regulations facilitated media capture
(e.g., new media law and media authority, channel allo‐
cations, restriction of press presence in parliament, and
selective advertisement tax), established Fidesz‐related
media networks (TV, print, and internet press) and reor‐
ganised and monopolised state‐funded public broadcast‐
ing (Z. Balázs & Hajdú, 2017, pp. 99–100; Körösényi et al.,
2020, pp. 103–106). News editing practices of party‐
friendly public and private media show the party and
the government in a positive light. At the same time, in
the pro‐government media, representation of the oppo‐
sition is lacking except for its negative portrayal.
The result of personalisation and cartelisation is
clear: The government, the party, and the leader are ulti‐
mately inseparable. Moreover, as suggested by Z. Balázs
and Hajdú (2017), the party’s centrality and organi‐
sational autonomy can be questioned: Is Fidesz only
an “electoral machinery” in the party leader’s hands?
It seems that the party’s purpose is only to maintain
electoral legitimacy, coordinate election campaigns, and
manage and reconcile the complex personal and polit‐
ical interests and ambitions of the political elite. Many
of the crucial political functions are managed outside of
the party framework: Political communication is defined
as government communication channelled through the
pro‐government media, while interest and preference
aggregation are conducted via national consultations.
Meanwhile,mobilisation is driven by external actorswho
make up Fidesz’s political Hinterland. In this sense, it is
the government or the prime minister that has a party
and not the other way around.
5. Conclusion
In many respects, Fidesz is clearly an extreme case as it
has shown an unprecedented organisational transforma‐
tion by adapting to the changing political demands. As a
result, the party has been able to take root in civil society
and occupy the state at the same time.
Through dissection of the building blocks of the party,
the article is aimed to gain insight into Fidesz’s hybrid
party structure. On the onehand,we argue that the party
combines the characteristics of mass andmovement par‐
ties in building organisation and activist networks. Based
on an ideologically integrated community and collec‐
tive identity, the party operates extensive offline and
online networks. On the other hand, Fidesz also adapts
components of personal and cartel parties. Party lead‐
ership has not just become more personalised and cen‐
tralised than ever before; the party in public office, that
is, the government, has also cut itself adrift from the
rest of the party and established a dominant position in
many realms of the public sphere through occupying the
state (e.g., patronage, clientelism) and the reconfigura‐
tion of institutions, such as the electoral system. To coun‐
terbalance its dominant elite position, it has become
essential to facilitate and maintain a quasi‐direct rela‐
tionship between party leaders and supporters through
participatory practices, fulfilling the populist appeal. It is
critical to note that Fidesz did not only transform its
own practices and strategies, and thus the party itself,
but also successfully modified the surrounding political
framework: party competition (Enyedi, 2016), the party
system (by establishing a “predominant party system”;
see Horváth & Soós, 2015), and the political regime
(Körösényi et al., 2020).
The case of Fidesz, although special, holds two gen‐
eral lessons for us. First, modern political parties often
simultaneously use different organisational strategies in
an eclectic way to achieve their goals. Personalisation
(Musella, 2018) and cartelisation (Katz & Mair, 1995) are
well‐known, but there are multiplying signs of a renais‐
sance in mass‐party practices (cf. Heinisch & Mazzoleni,
2016) and the movement activity used by the parties
(Muldoon & Rye, 2020). Second, loosening institutional
and political barriers can lead to extraordinary organisa‐
tional forms. For example, the introduction of the prac‐
tices ofmovements andmovement parties is not new for
mainstream parties (see the Labour Party in the UK with
the upsurge of the pro‐Corbyn Momentum). However,
the highly centralised, presidentialised, and personalised
leadership of Fidesz, which lacks internal organisational
constraints, has been able to generate movement activ‐
ity in a top‐down manner. Perhaps the biggest distor‐
tions were caused by the lack of external constraints
which disappeared because of the victory series from
2010. These developments show the cartel thesis from
a new angle. What happens when a party does not have
to cooperatewith other actors to allocate state resources
and control the political market? One of the major fea‐
tures of the cartel thesis is seemingly missing, that is,
elite cooperation, but the cartel is created within the
party and its Hinterland.
As a result, the party’s boundaries becameblurred, as
many actors ranging from activists to government organ‐
isations act in Fidesz’s interest. Paradoxically, hybridisa‐
tion did not strengthen the party itself since its domi‐
nance is ensured through the embeddedness of the party
elite in economic, social, and political networks. The win‐
dow of opportunity presented itself when Fidesz came
into a government position with a qualified majority,
allowing it to conquer not only positions but institutions
outside of Fidesz (such as the MCC or pro‐government
civil organisations). In our assessment, this process does
not create a new party type. It just provides a new strat‐
egy combining the advantages of the existing organisa‐
tion and mobilisation strategies to overcome challenges
a party could face in the electoral and governmental
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arena of party politics. This has become particularly spec‐
tacular in the extreme case presented by Fidesz, which
was able to apply this strategy at will under particularly
favourable conditions.
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